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THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS.

It is the purpose of the normal compensation law to provide
an indemnity in proportion to the wage-loss resulting from death"
or incapacity caused by accident I arising out of a risk of employnient. But death or incapacity may be either wholly and directly, or only partly or indirectly caused by an accident. If
wholly and directly caused thereby there is no question but that
the resulting wage-loss should be charged entirely to the accident. But if only partly or indirectly caused thereby, many difficult questions arise. Those questions are the subject of this
article.
'Not only are the terms and conditions appropriate to an accident compensation law inappropriate to be applied to diseases, but it is also the universal opinion of European experts that they cannot be applied thereto
without charging industry with a mass of misfortunes for which it is not
responsible. Accordingly the provisions of the sections of the British'
statute which apply to a few diseases specific to certain industries (and
therefore called "industrial diseases") are radicallv different from those of
its sections applying to accidents, being precisely Ritted to their special purpose. Nevertheless many of the American workmen's compensation statutes
(Caiifornia. Connecticut. Iowa, 3Massachusetts. Michigan. New Hampshire,
Ohio and Wvoming) have been made prima fade to cover diseases as well
as accidents simply by eliminating, from measures appropriate only to acci(Tents. the fundamental condition that there need be an accident. The construction and effects of such undefined departures from precedents do not
come within the purview of this article.
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\Where death or incapacity i, only partly .r indirectly caused
by an accident there must be some other caose or causes involved.

And such other cause or causes may he either anteri,,r or posterior
to the accident.order..

These two classes of caues will be taken up in

CAUSES ANTERIOR TO TIE ACCIlDENT.

An anterior cause may be either (i) a pre-existing disease,
(2) a pre-existing infirmity, or (3) old age.
Pre-existing Diseases.
A disease may be.defined for our purlposes as an organic ill
of gradual growth. Where a workman suffering frcim a disease
is the victim of an accident his disease may either. (I ) aggravate
the condition of his injury from the accident, or 12) be itself aggravated or accelerated, either (a) directly .by the accident, or
(b) indirectly by some conscqutnce of the accident. If. then.
death or incapacity results from any such aggravation or acceleration it is really the result of a combination of two causes
-the disease and the accident. Under such circumstances should
the indemnity be computed with allowance for the results of the
pre-existing disease, that is, should the injury in effect be divided
into two parts. one part morbid and the other part traumatic, and
the indemnity be based solely upon the latter? And under what
relations of cause and effect should death or incapacity be attributed in whole or in part to an accident when a pre-existing
disease enters also into the chain of causation?
The English rule on these questions is as follows. Where
an outbreak of a latent disease is caused by an accident the resulting death or incapacity should be deemed the result-i. e.,
entirely the result-of the accident. 3 The test. in case of death,
" The logical analysis followed in this article IS -.aken in large part from
"Trait? . . . dc la Legislation sur ¢s$Accidents du Travail", by Adrien
Sachet (Paris. Sirey. igog), Chap. VI.
'Clover. Clayton & Co. v. Hughes (House of Lc.rds. T91o, 3 Butter1 id.
worth's Vorkinen' C,,nipensation Cases. 275: Mclnnes V. Dunsimnir.
(ir.)o: Trodden v.
.26 (IiKkt): John.on v. S. S. "Torrin .tiVn".3 id. (
Lennard. 4 id. itx) ,ti ): Lee v. Baird. T id. 34 1i,,iS: Lloyd v. Sugg. 2
Minton-Senhouse's Workmen's Cnimpcnsation Cases ; i )oo).
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is, was it the disease that caused the death, so that whatever
the workman had been doing he would probably have died all
the same, or did the work he was doing contribute to it in anymaterial degree ?4 It is sufficient that the accident merely accelerates the result. Where a workman (lies from a disease from
which he would not have died at the time at which and in the
way in which he did die had it not been for an accident, the accident must be held to have been the cause of his death.' And
where the pre-existing disease is aggravated, not directly by the
accident, but indirectly by some consequence of the accident, the
resulting incapacity is likewise to be deemed a result of the accident.6
No slip, wrench, sudden jerk. unusual exertion, or exterior
violence is necessary to constitute the accident. The sudden outbreak or acceleration of a disease. to which a normal exertion of
even the lightest kind of work has contributed, is sufficient. Almost is an accident to be inferred from the sudden outbreak of
a pre-existing disease while at work. 7 But not quite.$
The French rule differs only in requiring something more
distinctly in the nature of an accident due to sudden, violent, and
exterior cause arising out of a risk of the employment and a
closer relation of cause and effect between such accident and the
death or incapacity. Where an outbreak of a latent disease is
caused by an accident, the resulting incapacity should be deemed
the result of the accident. The basis for the compensation prescribed by the statute is the full difference between the earnings
before the accident and the earning capacity thereafter, and it
is error to make any allowance or deduction therefrom for a'
pre-existing morbid condition.9 Where the incapacity following
'Clover, Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, supra, note 3.
*Golder v. Caledonian Rwy. Co., 40 S. L R. 89 (x9oz), and cf. Punnigan

v. Cavan, 4 B. AV. C. C., 386 (1911).
'Ystradowen Co. v. Griffiths, 2 B. NV. C. C. 357 099o).
t Clover. Clayton & Co. v.Hughes, supra, note 3. It must be said, owever. that the inferior courts are exercising the greatest ingenuity to avoid

the logical consequences of this decision.
*Cf. Hawkins Y. Powells Co. (Ct. of Appeal, 1911), 4 B. XV. C. C. 178;
Kerr v. Ritchies (Ct. of Appeal. i913),
6 B. W. C. C. 419.

SDevaux v. Compagnie Babcock, Cour de Cessalion, Oct. 24, z9o4;
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an accident is attributed by the medical experts one-third directly to the accident and two-thirds to a pre-existing state of
arthritisin and habits of intemperance, the compensation due is
based upon the entire reduction in earning capacity and not upon
only one-third of it.'( 'Where incapacity from a pre-existing
malady has undoubtedly been accelerated by an accident, though
the malady might have progressed to the same stage anyhow, the
incapacity is the result of the accident.1 1
But the accident must be the determining cause of the crisis
of the :pre-existing disease, and not merely the circumstance to
reveal a diseased condition.' 2 And it must be the direct and immediate cause of the death or incapacity, it.not being sufficient
that by diminishing the forces of the victim and confining him
to bed it has indirectly contributed to that result.1 3 If an injury
is really caused by a simple exertion, even though such exertion
be entirely normal to the victim's work, the injury should be considered as resulting from an accident.1 4 But an injury should
not be attributed to a slight exertion, jolt, stumble, or other false
movement, if the morbid condition of the victim makes it doubtful that such event was the determining cause.' 5
Vhere the reThe German rule is similar to the French. W
quired causal connection exists between an accident and the
death or incapacity, the latter is to be deemed altogether the
result of the accident, though a pre-existing morbid condition has
contributed to it. And it does not matter that, were it not for
the accident, the death or incapacity would have apparently resulted from the disease within a definite short time anyhow. In
Bompard v. Compagnie P.-L-M., id., July 31, i9o6; Hemart v. Mia, id.,
Apr. 12, 19o7.
" Lamoine v. Compagnie Commentry, id., July i8, t.9oS.
"Conipagnie de Gaz v. Sar, id., March 25, i9o8.
" 'Letellier
v. Turco, id., May x, 1g1t.
' Gauthier v. Chemin de Fer, id,, July 2-, i9o5-.
DQ
Quantin v. Ancanne, id., Dee. 22, 1909. See also Socifti Commentry v.

Defour. id., Feb. z7, t9o8.
Duhois V. Compagnie du Nord. id.. Dee. 23. i9o3: Lambert v. Odoul,
id.. Feb. io. ioox8: Revault v. Pasquer. id.. July 8. 19o2: Letellier v. Turco,
supra. note 12.

hernia.

As might be inferred. the majority of these cases relate to
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a case such as just specified the compensation for the accident
should not be limited to the time within which the victim would
have died or been incapacitated by disease anyhow.1e
But the employment cannot be held respousible for sudden
injuries to health occurring during the course of work, if they
may be accounted for altogether by bodily predisposition and
by reason of their causes cannot be deemed accidents in the
general sense of the word.' 7 In general outbreaks of hernia,
tuberculosis, heart disease, etc., occurring during the work, are
not to be deemed work accidents unless there was some severe
exertion or event of violence to cause them, it being considered
otherwise that the work only furnished the opportunity for and
was not the cause of such outbreaks. But where peculiar circumstances clearly indicate that a merely normal exertion has
truly caused an outbreak of disease, it will be held a workaccident.'
Such is seldom the case with herniao
American decisions on these points are as yet few. Where
a workman dies following an internal rupture suffered while
exerting great pressure with his body in his work and it is
found that the proximate cause of death was the unusual pressure on parts weakened by disease, which but for such pressure
would have held out for a considerable time, the death should
be deemed the result of the accident.20 Where a school teacher
in charge of children at play died of an attack of arterial sclerosis
brought on by a blow from a basketball, the death should be
deemed the result of the accident, being caused proximately by
the accident.2 1 Where an employee dies from heart disease
""Handbuch dcr Unfallversicherung, 1909" (Kreitkof & Hartel, Leipzig. 1 99). pp. 255-6. The first volume of this publication contains an officio
summary of the decisions construing the German workmen's accident insurance statutes and is authoritative.
" German Imperial Insurance Office (Grosser Senat, Feb. 26, 1914), cit.
"Bulletin des Assurances Sociales", April, 1914, V. 26.

'Hadbuch, pp. 7z-74, 76.
"Id., pp. 73, 267.
'Voorhees v. Smith. 92 At. 28o (N. J. 1914).

Industrial Accident Board; Homan's Case,

2

See'also Massachusetts'

"Reports of Cases under the

Massachusetts' Workmen's Compensation Law," 775 (1914); Gariella's Case,

".Milwaukee v. Industrial Commission, i6o Wis. 238 (giS).
2

id.. 137 (194).

This case
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brought to a crisis by hurry and excitement, his death is an injury arising out of the employment 2 Where were it not for
an accident a disease would have resulted in the victim's death
or incapacity within a definite time anyhow, the compensation
23
for the injury should be limited to such time.
Some American statutes define "injuries" to be compensated for to include only "injuries by violence to the physical
structure of the body and such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom." 24 Quacre; whether such provisions exclude injuries which consist simply of outbreaks of pre-existing
diseases caused by the "violence" of minimum exertions?
Prc-existingInfirmities.
The word infirmity is here used to mean a fixed injury,
distinguishable from both a disease and old age by the fact that
it is not progressive. Where a workman with an infirmity subsequently suffers another permanent injury by accident, generally,
though not always, the two injuries are distinct, and there is
consequently no confusion of causes as to them, such as there is
where a single injury results from a pre-existing disease and an
accident combined. But there is often a serious confusion of
causes as to the victim's subsequent incapacity. To illustrate:
A workman blind in one eye, later loses also the other eye. Had
this accident occurred to a normal person with two eyes, the
resulting incapacity would be slight, but owing to the previous
loss of the other eye it is total. Is it, then, proper to charge all
of this total incapacity to the accident which has caused only the
second
"A injury?
disposition is manifested, particularly in some
of our
American statutes, to make the answer to this question depend
upon whether or not the pre-existing infirmity has been comfurther holds that "proximate cause" has a somewhat different meaning in
compensation law from its meaning in negligence law.
'Brightman's Case. --o Mass. 17 (1914).
"Horne's Case, I Mass. IV' C. C34 (913); Jones' Case, 2 id. 301
(1914).
3"l.ouisiana. See. 3o: Nebrdska. Sec. 52 b: Pennsylvania, Sec. 31. For
other somewhat similar provisions. see statutes cited post, p. 447.
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pensated for. But that is ilhngical. E.ither the second injury
has caused all the incalacity to be compensated for, or it has not.
But the question persists, where two successive injuries have occurred, should the rule be that the combined results of both shall
be charged altogether to the employer of the time of the second?
In the cases immediatelh following, the pre-existing infirmity
was not the subject of compensation. Where a one-eyed workman loses the sight of his remaining eve by accident, by the terms
of the statute the compensation due isbased upon the difference

between the earnings before the later injury and the wage earning
capacity thereafter, and not upon what the reduction in earnings
would have been had it not been for the pre-existing infirmity."
And the same rule applies where a one-handed workman injures
or loses his remaining han (d.' Where a workman, who is without sight in one eye. loses the sight of his second eye. lie is entitled to compensation for total disability. -7
It should be noted in this connection that the "hand cases"
differ from the "eve cases", in that the loss of the first hand
almost always results immediately in reduced earnings, whereas
the loss of the first eve often does not do so until after the second
injury. Consequently Matter of Schwab r- Emporium Co.,28
which holds that where a one-handed man loses his second hand
lie is entitled to compensation for total disability, does not sopport the rule in the preceding cases, for the reason that in this
case the victim's earnings at the time of his second injury already reflected the loss from the first injury, so that the difference
between his earnings before and after the second injury fairly
represented the conseqtences of it alone.
The contrary rule that the loss of an eye gives right to compensation for only partial disability, although the injured wdrkman has already lost his other eye and in consequence is totally
Ddinc v. Feller. Cour de Cass.. July 23, ioo2: Goudemant v. ThuriotGodin. id.. Dec. 10. i902: Leclaire v. Morillon. id.. Nor. ii. 19o3; Ollivier v.
Ateliers de la Loire. id.. -Nov. 25, i9o5: Busson v. OMy id.. Dec. i, z9o.
- Servant v. IHm.n. id.. June 3o. i903.
AcC. Bd. (194): z Mass. IV. C. C. Sg4.
- Morrimon's Case, Masq lt.
6
i . App,. Div. IN. Y.) 614. aff'd 216 N. V. (Nov. 1915).
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disabled, has been laid down by the Supreme Courts of Minnesota 29 and Michigan, 0 construing specific provisions of their
local statutes.3 1
The following cases differ from the preceding in that the
two injuries were not distinct, but the later aggravated or added
to the earlier. Where a workman suffers impairment of vision
in one eye by an accident and thereafter totally loses the sight
of the same eye by another accident, the degree of incapacity
following the second accident is the result thereof.3 2 If a workman who has lost, the sight of one eye, but without any disfigurement, later suffers an accident which necessitates the removal of
that eye and is unable to secure employment because of the disfigurement, such "incapacity to obtain work" constitutes "incapacity for work", and is the result of the later accident.3 3
Where a pre-existirig infirmity is increased by an accident,
as, for example, where a workman loses a limb which was already defective, the consequences of the two injuries are not to be
4
separated in fixing the compensatioff for the later.3
The attribution of the consequences of two successive injuries altogether to the second sometimes operates to the disadvantage of the victim. Thus, where a workman who has lost
a finger by accident and received compensation for temporary
total disability, is taken back at lighter work at his old wages,
and thereafter is further incapacitated by his wounded hand's
becoming inflamed from the habitual use of a pneumatic hammer, his resulting incapacity is the result of the second injury
and consequently is not due to an accident.s.
Let us turn now to cases of successive injuries, both falling
under the compensation law.
Under the French rule the compensation for an accident
to a sound workman resulting in an infirmity is based upon the
" State ex rel. Garvir v. Dist. Court, 151 N. W. 9io (1974).
" Weaver v. Maxwell, i52 N. IV. o93 (1915).
Q. v., post, p. 428.
'Martin v. Barnett, 3 B. W. C. C. 146 (191o).
aBall v. Hunt (H. of L, 1912), $ B. IV. C. C. 459.
Handbuch, p. 256.
Noden v. Galloways, 5 B. W. C. C. 7 (19i1).
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consequent reduction ki his *'professional capacity", which is
measured, not by the difference between his individual wages
or earnings before and after the injury, but by the reduction in
earnings normally resulting (both immediately and throughout
the future) from such an injury.-" Thus it has been held, ignoring the circumstance that the victim had been taken back by his
old employer at his old wage, that the reduction in professional
capacity from the loss of an eye should be fixed at twenty-five
per cent.3 r If, then, a workman so compensated for the loss of
one eye should thereafter lose his other eye, the total reduction
in earnings resulting from both injuries should be compensated
for by the employer of the time of the second injury, and yet
the workman should continue to receive the compensation
awarded for the first injury.38 This is an exceptional case presented to indicate a defect in the rule. Where, however, the
wages following the first injury have actually been reduced in
proportion to the reduction in "professional capacity", as is
generally the case, the application of this rule does not charge
any part of the loss from the first injury to the second.
The German law is similar to the French. The compensation for an accident to a sound workman resulting in an infirmity is based upon the consequent reduction in his earning capacity. "Earning capacity," in this connection, is given substantially
the same meaning as "professional capacity" under the French
law. 29 Loss of earning capacity includes inability to obtainEber v. Bernanose, Cour de Cass., Nov. 26, 15o9; Sociiti Denain v.
Donnez. id.. Jan. 7, i9o2. Some allowance for the potential loss from increased liability to disablement seems also to enter into the appraisal of
"professional capacity" after injury. Under the application of this rule,
what is recognized to be a serious abuse has developed in France and Germany, of allowing small life pensions (popularly known as "drink money
pensions") for trifling infirmities, though they entail no reduction in actual
earning power. In part this is a consequence of an arbitrary assumption of
a reductior in professional capacity regardless of the actual results. In this.
connection 1 should be noted that none of the Euiopean compensation laws
contain schedules of specific compensations for special injuries, such as are
common to the American laws.
' Benoist v. Berthelot, Cour d'.4ppel de Renmes. Nov. 2,. igoo; and cEf
Raffinerie v. Recuwe. Cour de Cass.. Jan. 19, 19o3.
"Cf. Sachet, p. 248.
llandbuch. pp. -62-4. Cf. comments under note 36.
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work resulting from the- injury. And reduction therein is not
necessarily to be measured by the wages received upon the resumption of work. For example, the fact that the employer takes
the victim back at his old wages does not avoid a reduction in
earning capacityA4 A heavy reduction in earning capacity is always to be assumed from the loss of an eye 'l-never less- than
twenty-five per ccnt and sometimes thirty-three and one-third
per cent.4 2 If. then, a second infirmity is thereafter suffered,
the existence of the first infirmity should not stand in the way of
full compensation for the second. 3 Supposing that earning
capacity is reduced fifty per cent by the first injury and that
the capacity remaining thereafter is cumpletely destroyed by the
second, the loss from the second is not fifty per cent of full
normal earning capacity, but one hundred per cent of a r-duccd
earning capacity." Therefore the first injury, and the questions
whether or not it has been compensated for. and, if so, at what
rate. are to be ignored as irrelevant. And the fact that the aggregate compensation for the two injuries may exceed one hundred per cent of actual earnings at the time of the second is immaterial, because the two compensations are proportions of two
43
distinct earning capacities.
Commenting upon this rule and upon the grounds therefor.
it is to be observed that the term "earning capacity" is used
therein indiscriminatelv in two different senses. In dt..termining
the loss from the first injury the remaining earning capacity is
not measured by wages, whereas in determining the loss from the
second injury the earning capacity preceding it would nornially
be measured by wages. and, consequently, in the period between
two injuries a workman (for examplc, one who has lost an
eve Without any actual reduction in wages) would be attributed
with two different earning capacities-the one to measure his
loss from the first injury and the other to measure his loss from
any later injury. The result might e an aggregate compensaHIlandbuch, p. 264.
Id., p. 266.
"Id., p. -65.

Id., p. -263.
dl. p. 265.
' Id., pp. 2.S-6.

TIlE CONSEQUENCES OF ACIDENTS

tion based upon one hundred and thirty-three per cent. of the
actual aggregate reduction in earning capacity resulting from
the two injuries. This result is avoided by a special statutory
provision in effect substituting "professional capacity" instead
of wages at the time of the second accident as the basis for computing the reduction in earning capacity resulting therefr6m.4
The English courts follow the letter of their statute in basing compensation for an infirmity upon the difference between
the injured person's earnings before the accident and the amount
he is earning or able to earn thereafter. But where he is taken
back by his old employer at his old wages, such wages, being an
act of grace, are not considered "earnings". And the earnings
immediately after resumption of work are not treated as the
permanent standard of what the workman is "able to earn after
the accident", if it appears that incapacity from the injury may
later develop or increase. Under either of the several .contingencies just specified a "suspensory award" should be made, so
that compensation may be awarded at any later time and computed according to the then existing conditions, when and if a
reduction in earnings actually occurs. 4 But what rule should
be applied, if. after a suspensory award for. say, the loss of an
eye, the workman later loses the other eye, seems not conclusively settled. According to the earlier decisions.4 the entire
wage loss from both injuries should be charged to the second. accident: hut the alternative of opening the suspensory award and
charging part of the loss to the earlier irijury is practicable.
In America, Wisconsin and Michigan decisions leave the
rule for compensating for the later of successive injuries similarly in doubt. In the absence of evidence that the loss of or a
permanent injury to one eye results in sonic actual reduction in
earning capacity, it was held to he error to award compensation
49 If. then, the
therefor as for permanent partial disability.
"Law of June 3o, igoo, Art.

Art.571.

io, Sec. 5; now Code of July i9, 1911,

Taylor v. London & N. AV. Rwy. (Houce of Lords, 1912), 5 B. W. C.
C. 218.
"Cited mLpra. p. 424.
"International Harvester Co. v. Tndtustrial Commission, 147 N. W. 53
(Wis. 1914); lirschkorn v. Friese, iso X. W. 8ki (Mich. its).
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second eye should later be lost by accident, should the aggregate
consequences of both injuries be charged solely to such later
accident? In New Jersey, however, it has been held that though
no loss of wages results from an injury, yet the victim is entitled to compensation if his "physical efficiency" is thereby im50
paired.
Many of the American statutes contain express provisions
relating to the contingency of successive infirmities. Some prescribe more or less clearly that the consequences of an accident
shall be distinguished from the aggravations resulting from a
pre-existing infirmity and be compensated for as if such infirmity
did not exist.5 1 The Michigan statute'*2 is ambiguous, but has
been construed to have the same effect."' Others provide in
effect that the compensation for a secon l injury shall be based
upon the aggregate consequences of the two injuries, but with
credit for the compensation, if any, awarded for the first injury.5 4 And others are ambiguous, prescribing generally that
the compensation shall be based upon the "earning capacity" at
the time of the second accident.55
As has already been noted the rule of some of these American statutes that the employer of the time of the second injury
owes compensation for the combined consequences of both injuries unless the first has been compensated for, though well intentioned, is unprincipled.
The remaining confusion on the subject of successive infirmities seems to arise from a failure to distinguish between
two different conditions: (I) The first injury may have resulted
in a reduction in actual earnings (wages) f2irly commensurate
Burbage v. Lee, 93 Atl. 859 (1915).

'California, Sec. i5 b 2 (io); Illinois, Sec. To h; Minnesota, Se. 13 c;
Nebraska, Sec. 28; New York, Sec. 15 (6); Nevada, Sec. 25; Wyoming,
Sec. 19 b.

Schwab v. Emporium Co., supra, note 8, construed the New York

act before the provision here cited was inserted by amendment.
Pt. II, Sec. ii.
"Weaver v. Maxwell, 152 N. V. 993 (1915).
"Indiana, Sees. 33-35; Maryland, Sec. 24; Montana, See. x6i; Oregon.
Sec. 21 h; Washington, Sec. 66D4-5 g.
"Colorado, Sec. 4 b II: Maine. Sec. I (IX ); Oklahoma. Art. I. See.
6; Rhode Island. Art. II. Sec. t3 d; Wisconsin. Sec. 2394-io (id).
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with the reduction in "professional capacity". (2?) It may not.
In the first case the workman's actual earnings (wages) preceding the second injury may properly be used as th& basis from
which to compute the reduction in earning capacity caused by
such injury; but in the second case they may not-then only his
"professional capacity" at the time of the second injury is a
reasonable basis.
.Old Age.
Old age differs from an infirmity in that it is progressive;
and from a disease in that its progress is always certain.
Under the compensation law old age gives rise to two questions. First. Where an aged workmen suffers a trifling accident, which only becatise of his pre-existing physical defects is
followed by permanent incapacity, should such incapacity be
deemed the result of the accident? Second. Where a workman
who is permanently incapacitated by accident is so infirm that lie
would soon have become incapacitated anyhow, even had there
been no accident, should his incapacity for the remainder of his
life be charged entirely to the accident?
Under almost all the older compensation laws the rule that
aggravations or accelerations of incapacity due to old age should
be charged to the accident has become established almost without
question and with infreiuent recourse to the higher courts.
But unfavorable experience under that rule has caused the questions just stated to be raised when framing, and upon the construction of, later statutes.
The German Imperial Insurance Office has ruled that where
incapacity is caused by an accident the right to a life pension is
not affected by the fact that even if there had been no accident
the victim would soon have been incapacitated from old age."
In Massachusetts it has been held that where a workman
is totally incapacitated as the result of an injury caused by his
work the fact that lie was physically failing and would be so in"Handbuch. p. 2.. "An interesting illustration of the results of this
rule is that where a workman, on the point of retirement on account of the
weaknesses of old age. is killed by accident, leaving a very young widow, she
is entitled to a pension for the remainder of her life. which turns the accident into a source of great profit.
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capacitated anyhow in the course of a. few years does not bar him
froll full coml)ensation."' 7
The W\isconsin statute contains an express provision reducing the rate (of conipensation five per cent for workmen over
tiftv-\-ive yevars )f age, ten per cevnt for those over sixty, and fifteen per cent ft'r those over sixty-five5 s
Sum mary.
Reviewing the entire subject of anterior causes of aggravatioIn, two important controversial questions stand out and call
for especial consideration.
First. What'should be con.,idered a work-accident? The
-j. i~l rule is pecuiliar in hflding that the outbreak of a latent
disea.-e contributed to by a normal exertion of light work should
he ascrihed to an accident. even though the morbid condition of
tle victim indicates .otlcthing else as the determining cause.
The effect is to place upon the employer a heavy charge for an
extra risk for every sickly or age( person he takes on. and con.cqucntly to impel him to discriminate extraordinarily against
such persons and against persons of unknown health and habits
in giving employment. Simply to hold the employer liable for
aggravations of the consequences of accidents from anterior
causes, even where such accidents are really due to risks of the
empl.vient, leads. as will be noted later, to much discrimination
a.gainst tle physically defective: but the English rule goes still
further and greatly increases that discrimination, by holding the
emp hoyer liable in practice for the consequences of risks arising
altogether from the physical defects of the person and not at all
from the nature or conditions of the work at which the person
is employed. In so doing this rule violates the doctrine of "trade
zisk", upon which the compensation law is based. The better
rule. therefore, is that laid down in the French and German decisions and in the dissenting opinions in Clover, Clayton and
Company v. llughes. 9
Duprey's Case. 21o Mass. 189 (19T4).
SSecs. 2394-9.

"' Supra, note 3.
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Second. Should the wage loss from death or incapacity rest,lting from an anterior cause. aggravated or accelerated by accident. or from an injury by accident. aggravate(l by an anterior
cause. be charged entirely to the accident, without any deduction
for the consequences of such anterior cause? Ve have seen that
the affirmative answer to this qpestion has prevailed in all the
foreign jurisdictions considered. But it has so prevailed only
by emphasizing the letter of the statutes, and in some jurisdictions only after a long struggle against a strong minority opinion.
And in the .\merican statutes there is manifested a tendency
towards an alternative rule for pre-existing infirmities and old
age. It seems purely fortuitous that it is not yet here sought to
apply the alternative rule also to pre-existing diseases, 60 for they
are a much weightier factor in aggravating the consequences of
accidents than are pre-existing infirmities, and the objections to
the established nile are stronger in application to diseases than
to infirmities.
The alternative rule. and the arguments for and against the
two rules are briefly as follows.
The established rule is based upon.the proposition that an
injured workmnan's earning capacity at the time of an accident
(in practice generally measured by his average earnings or wages
immediately before the accident) may in all cases properly be
taken as the basis for computing the loss in earning capacity resuilting from the accident. But under some conditions such basis
is improper. Admittedly in the case of a young person some
allowance shouild be made for the prospective increase in his
future earning capacity upon reaching maturity." By parity, of
reasoning some allowance should be made in the case of an
aged person for the impending reduction in his earning capacity.
And similarly where a workman is suffering from a serious disease or infirmity his prospects for the future are not equal to what
" But perhaps some of the provisions of American statutes cited tos.
pp. 447-8. may be construed or at least intended to apply to cases of preexisting disease. And see also decisions of Mass. Ind. Ace: Bd.. supm, p. 4=

&Proviinns to thi effect are to he found in the laws of Great Rritain,

California. Colorado. Maryland. Massachusetts. New York. Ohio, Oklahoma.

and Wisconsin.
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they would be if he were sound, notwithstanding that for the
time being his earnings or earning capacity, are still unimpaired.
Therefore in such cases the injured workman's prospective
earning capacity-his "professional capacity"-at the time of
the accident, which, if he is sickly, infirm, etc., may be much
less than his immediate earning capacity, should be used as the
basis from which to compute his loss from the accident.
T
,n support of this rule it is argued that (i) it is in accord
with the principle and purpose of the law,6 2 (2) it would enable employers to take on and to continue to employ workmen
who are known or suspected to have latent diseases or infirmities
or who are approaching ol age without subjecting themselves
to the charge of an extra risk in consequence, and thereby would
benefit both industry and the working classes; whereas the established rule tends to create of such persons a new class of unemployables, though for some indeterminate time they may still
be able to work and to earn good wages.
A committee appointed by the British Home Office in November, 1903, to inquire into the operations of the workmen's
compensation acts, recommended as a cure for this evil effect of
the established rule (which it found to be serious) that the law
be amended to enable employers to hire aged and infirm persons
upon special terms as to compensation for accidents, and suggested an age limit of sixty, if hale, and under that age if infirm
or maimed. This recommendation was not adopted. It appears
to be subject to the criticism that it might go too far in the way
of enabling employers to contract out of their proper responsibilities.
On the other hand many labor representatives seek to cure
this evil either (a) by a provision of law that insurance
premium rates "shall take no account of any physical impairment of employees" ;G3 or (b) by state insurance at "flat rates".
'For an indication of an intention on the part of the framers of the
French Statute to exclude aggravations from anterior causes, cf. "La Responsibilit' ct h's Accidents dvi Travail", by Hlenry Sagot (Rousseau, Paris,
10)04), p. IT3.

Pennsylvania. See. 4: House of Commons Bill of June
Mr. A. If. Gill.

25, 1914,

by
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But the former remedy cannot be efficient, because, though
physical imlairments of employees inay be ignored.in tile inspections of establishnents to fix prenimuin rates for insurance,vet the results of that element of ri.-k will inevitably appear in
the loss cost and must eventually cause a corresponding differentiation in rates, unless -flat rates" be resurnted to. \nd -flat
rates- as a remedv would be worse than the disease, since, bv
equalizing the insurance charge to employers, regardless of the
relative hazards of their respective establishments, such rates
would in effect subsidize dangerous conditions and discourage
accident prevention. And both of these proposed remedies are
expedients to cure an evil created by law. for which the natural
remedy is to amend the law so that it will no longer create the
evil. This result, it is claimed, would be effected by the adoption
of the alternative rule under discussion.
The arguments in support of the established rule, on the
other hand, together with the specific objections to such arguments, are briefly as follows.
i. The letter of nearly all the existing compensation statutes supports the established rule.
However conclusive this argument may be as to what the
law is, it is of little weight as to what the law should be.
2. It is a well established rule of the common law that a
person is liable for the damages which proximately result from
his culpable act, no matter whether the condition of the injured
person before the act caused the damages to be greater than
they otherwise would have been. And the compensation law
emphasizes rather than alters this principle."e
But the proposition with which this argument concludes
seems to be directly contrary to the British authorities. The
House of Lords has held that under the compensation law the
employment need not be the proximate cause of the accident
and that the accident in turn need not be the proximate cause
This shows that the compensation law has to
of the injury."
"Cf. 29 Harvard Law Review

S. L R. 1"7.
'Clover.

1o4

(Nov.,

iq95), citing Lee v. Baird, 45

Clayton & Co. v. Hughes, supra, note 3.
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a large extent abrogated the rule of proximate cause. How
then has it emphasized the principle? 6
3. If the accident, following which a workman dies or is
incapacitated, had not happened. he, though then suffering from
a disease, an infirmity, or old age, would have earned his wages
for some indeterminate time longer, and perlials just as long as
any given one of his sound. healthy, or younger comrades.
In application to pre-existing infinnities, because they are
fixed and not progressive, this argument is sound, so. far as it
goes. But in application to pre-existing diseases and old age
it is most unsound, because it is based upon a general assumption of facts, which more often than not is directly contrary
to the probabilities. To illustrate. In application to a case where
the victim of an accident was suffering from a disease which
would have brought about incapacity within a definite time without any accident, this argument mapiifestly does not hold good.
And in cases like Clozvr, Claylon and Company v. Hughes,"
where a mere normal exertion of light work has contributed to
the fatal termination of a disease, it is absurd to argue that
were it not for such "accident" the workman plight have continued to earn his old wages for an indeterminate period, since
ability to endure such a normal exertion is a prerequisite to
earning wages.
4. Ifwe should undertake to weigh the modifications which
the physical peculiarities of each victim may produce in the
consequence of his injury, we would encounter insuperable difficulties. What man is there who has not or who is not disposed
to some disease or infirmity? In man's physical constitution the
ideal of perfection is never attained. Consequently the greater
part of accidents would raise the question of the influence of
pre-existing maladies or infirmities, and an attempt to measure
that influence whenever the question is raised would so swell
SIn some other jurisdictions. however, the rule of proximate cause is
not so sweepingly discarded. Cf. Cour de Cassation. Feb. 2z, 1912. post,
Nnd some Am.'rican decisions do emphasize it. Gt. Western Co. v.
I :15Voorhees v. Smith, (s2 At. 28o (N. J.
15! l'ac. i 13 (Cal.
1914) ; Milwaukee v. Ind. Comm.. 6o Wis. 238 (1915).
" Supra, note 3.
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the volume of litigation as to defeat one of the primary purposes
of the compensation law, which is to avoid litigation.°,
This argument is probably the strongest in favor of the
established rule. and would he conclusive, if its propositions were
exact. But they are, more or less, exaggerations. Under the
French and German practices the reduction in "professional
capacity" resulting from diseases and infirmities after accidents
is all the time being successfully valued by medical experts.
There is no reason why such reduction before accidents cannot
he equally well valued. Where the evidence for such valuation
fails, it simply results in some advantage to the injured workmen
in practice over theory."S And experience in France, in the
jurisdictions wherein the practice of distinguishing the results
of anterior causes from the strict results of work-accidents prevailed for some years (until suppressed by the rulings of the
highest court), indicates that such practice would not cause any
noticeable increase in litigation. Indeed, it -is not certain but
that it would reduce litigation, for the established practice, by
holding out a gambling chance of compensation for invalidity,
if anything in the form of accident to which to attribute it has
happened or can be invented, perhaps breeds more litigation
than would the alternative practice.
CAUSES

POSTERIOR TO THE ACCIDENT.

The consequences of an injury by accident may be aggravated by one or more causes posterior to the accident, which
causes may be conveniently grouped and studied under the following categories: Contamination of wounds, the medical and
surgical treatment, suicide, new accidents, new diseases, misconduct of the victim.

Contamination of Wounds.
It is generally agreed that the infection of a wound with
tetanus, septicacmia, gangrene. ctc... should be charged to the
"Sachet, p. 244.
" On the foregoing propositions, cf. "L'Valuatlion des Incapaci.s'Per-

mancntes." by Dr. Ch. Remy (Vigot, Paris, i9o6), Ch. XVI.
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accident which caused the wound, unless imputable to the neglect
of the victim,7 or, it seems, to the intervention of some remote
cause.71 Where a workman's finger nail is torn off and he continues to work without notice to his employer and without taking
any care or precaution, death resulting from an infection of the
T2
wound should be charged to the misconduct of the victim.
But suppose that the wound is so trifling that it is not treated
as an accident (e. g. a painless scratch or abrasion, or a cinder in
the eye) and by reason of the consequent neglect it becomes
infected, is that a new' accident, or a result of the original injury, or should it be imputed to the misconduct of the victim?'In a case of a painless breaking of a blister, the Genan Insurance Office, reversing the tribunal of first instance, has held that
incapacity resulting from an infection of the wound should be
deened a result of the accident, regardless of whether the in74
fection occurred at or away from work. .
The Medical and Surgical Treatment.

Whether or not aggravations of the original injury caused
by the medical or surgical treatment should be considered to
result from the accident, is a question which so far has been
decided according to the apparent equities of each case, without
the development of any clearly defined rules or principles.
Where a workman (lies from the effects of chloroform,
administered by a surgeon employed by his employer's insurance

carrier, for the purpose. of an operation, his death is the result
of the accident.

5

Where a workman would have recovered

from the effects of an accident but for negligent and defective
treatment by a "bone-setter" to whom lie resorted, his continued
'*Cf. Dunham v. Clare, 4 N.-S. W. C C. 102 (1902); Burn's Case,
Co. v. Pillsbury, 151 Pac. 1136 (Cal. ig91).
'" Ilandbuch, p. 249.
'V\euve landr. v. Rocherean. Cour d'Appel d'4ngers, Aug. i, i902.
. IV. 519 (Mich. 1t5); Fleming's Case.
'Ci. Cline V. Studebaker. j.z N.
6
2 Mass. '. C. C. 411 (1014). and post. p. 44 . Xs to the contamination of
wounds incurred away from work. ci. Chandler v. Gt. W. Rwy., 5 B. W.
218 N[ass. 8 (z913); Gt. Western

C. C. 2S4 (1911).

11nIlidb"ch. p. 249.
;Veuve Perrotte v. Dior, Tribunal 17.-ranchcs, Feb. 8. 19o7.
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incapacity is not a result of the original injury.3 In a case
where. instead of amputating a badly lacerated hand, as was the
standard practice under the circumstances. the surgeon at a
public infirmary tried to save it by a series of operations entailing the repeated use of an anaesthetic, from the second administration of which thle patient died, it was held that the
treatment was reasonable and therefore that the'death was
chargeable to the accident. 7 Where a workman was put under
anaesthetics to amputate an injured finger. and immediately after
such amputation the surgeons decided to put him again under
anaesthetics, to remove a sore tooth of which he had complained,
in the course of which second operation he died. there being no
proof that the death was due to the first administration of the
anaesthetics, it was Jheld that it could not be charged to the
accident.7 s Where during an operation on a workman for accidental hernia it was discovered that he had a second hernia of
long standing and both were operated upon at the same. time,
and subsequently he died from heart weakness resulting from
the strain of the operation, it was held that there was evidence
to justify a finding that the death was the result of the accident."
Where a chauffeur, injured in the hand. was under treatment
in a hospital. where he went with the privity and consent of his
employer, and an abscess of the thumb developed, caused by an
unpadded splint, it was held that the injury was a result of the
accident, and, in the absence of evidence to show that it was due
to negligence of the physician, that it was unnecessary to decide
whether such negligence would amount to a break in the chain
80
of causation.
Under the German law the consequences of injudicious medical and surgical treatments have generafly been held to be
results of the accidents.81 But that conclusion would seem .to
" Humber Co. v. Barclay. s B. AV. C . .42 (9T).
" Shirt v. Calico Ass.. 2 B. 1V. C. C. .342 ("o4).
- Charles v. Walker. 2 B. AV. C. C. 5 (i9o0).
" Thrnisom v. Minter. 6 B. W. C. C. 424 (1, ).
5
.\t.s (X J. tqW.
"1cm.¢,h v. Albertshn.
"E.gl. 11andbuch, p. 250.
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follow practically from the fact that under that law the employers' mutual insurance associations, being obligated to supply
all necessary treatment, are, in return, given almost absolute
control over it.
A leading French commentator 82 has advanced the proposition that the consequences of the medical or surgical treatment
should always be deemed results of the accident, because the
risk of bad treatment, or, to put it more mildly, of
mistaken treatment, is an inevitable consequence of injury. But
this ignores the fact that the workman may himself be responsible
for the quality of his treatment and consequently for the degree
of such risk.8 3 It is submitted that a more just and expedient
rule would be as follows. The consequences of the medical or
surgical treatment should be deemed to result from the accident
unless responsibility therefor be imputable to the workman. And
such responsibility should be imputed to the workman wherever
he either exercises a right to select the physician, or neglects,
when he is able, to give his employer notice and opportunity
promptly to furnish competent treatment. This suggested rule
is based upon the supposition that it is expedient that the treatment should be furnished by the employer. In the abstract this
supposition is supported by the fact that the amount of the emplover's liability for compensation will depend greatly upon the
quality of the treatment. And in the concrete it is supported
by experience in France. where the fact that the injured workman may choose his own physician, though the employer pays
the charges. has resulted in such an inferior medical and surgical
service that the consequences of work-injurics in the aggregate
have been immensely aggravated by this posterior cause. It
does not suppose for its application that the employer should be
tinder legal obligation to provide the medical service. The
imposition of such an obligation upon him is apt to subject him
to abuse. For that reason, among others. such obligation is altogether excluded from the British law. and is limited to short
periods after the accident under the American laws. Itis sufficient that the risks of bail treatment are an ordinary consequence
" Sachet, p. 251.
F. g. Humber Co. v. Barclay. sipra. note -6.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS

439

of an accident to a workingman, which the employer should be
given every practicable opportunity to prevent, but which, if he
then does not or cannot prevent, may in justice be attributed to
the accident.
Poisoning caused by the workman's taking internally medi-.
cine meant for external use during the treatment of his injury,
under some circumstances shoul he considered a result of the
accident. Where the medicine was administered by a nurse in
a hospital would appear to be such a case:-" but not where it
was carelessly administered in the workman's. own home by a
small child, though it might be decided to the contrary had
the workman inadvertently taken it himself. W'here the workman deliberately takes more of a medicine than ordered, the
consequences are not to be attributed to his accident.
Under some conditions a contagious disease, contracted in
a hospital where the injured workman has been sent for treatment. may rightly be-attributed to the accident. But not unleqs
the risks thereby incurred were greater. than what the workman
would have incurred in his everyday life. Thus where a workman was sent from a distance to a hospital in Hamburg, where
an epidemic of cholera broke out and he caught the infection and
(lied, it was held that his death was to be deemed the result of
his accident, the epidemic not having reached the place where
he lived.80 Generally, typhoid fever may not be attributed to
the stay in a hospital.8 7
Suicide.
Death by suicide should be considered the result of an
accident if the pain and depression resulting from the accident.
cause the workman to lose his reason or will power or are otherwise the direct cause of his ending his life.88
Sachet. p. 25T.
" llii'uch. p. 251.

"Handbuch, p. 25.
To same effect, Ilavard v. Loys, Tribunal de

Rom'n. May 25, 19o5.

'Sachet. p. 252. citing German Insurance Office.
" I1nlbuch. p. 253: Malone v. Cayzer. i 1. W. C. C. 27 (1 w8): Buray
v. I)ehumay. (',nr de ('ass.. (ct. 25. 1ixi.: Spinatski's Case. 22o Mass. 526
(1914); Jasehick v. Iorner. N. J. Com. Pleas. Jan.. 1916.
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New Accidents.
Under exceptional circumstances a new accident should be.
considered the result of a previous accident. An accident on the
journey after injury to or fro a h,,:pital or sanitarium should
be deemed the result of the original accident, if due to the
enfeebled condition of the injured person or to extraordinary
risks incurred thereby. The usual risks of travel on street or
railway cars. however, are not such

extraordinary

risks."

Where an injured workman who has been discharged from a
hospital and sent home alone in the cars, though subject to
frequent attacks of vertigo, suffers an attack on the journey,.
falls and is injured, this injury should be deemed the result of
the original accident. "° Vhere a workman, whose leg had been
broken hut had sufficientlv healed to enable him to return to
work, fell lightly on level ground and suffered a renewal of the
old fracture, it may be that such second injury was due to the
insufficient consolidation of the old fracture rather than to the
later accident: but the burden is upon the victim to prove the
relation of cause and effect between the ( fracture and the
new injury. 9 '
N w Diseases.
Under some circumstances death or incapacity from a
disease incurred after an accident should be deemed a result of
the accidentThe English courts go extremely far in attributing to accidents the consequences of subsequent diseases. Where a hunter
has a fall and is wetted to the skin, and this, addeA(to the fact
that he has to ride home in the open. so lowers his vitality as
to allow the germs of pneumonia. generally present in the respiratory passages, to multiply and attack the hngs. causing death,
the death is "directly" caused by the accident. 92 Where a
m Handbuch, p. 25T.
"Sachet. p. 2-5.
citing Gcrnmar Insurance Office.
Leclercq v. Mines. Cour de Cass.. Jan. .28. i o3: llandbuch, p. 25o.
'n re l:therington. i K. P. ;9T (jqoo). and see also Isitt. v. Railway
C,.. 2) 0. B. 1). ;04 (W'1.
Co.s.
These ca.cs were on accident insurance
policie-, not stu1ject to the workien's compensation law.
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workman hurts his knee and by reason of his crippled condition
is greatly delayed getting home and thereby unusually .exposed
to severe weather, as the result of which pneumonia supervenes
and he is incapacitated, the question is whether his condition
is the result of the accident in the sense that it is occasioned by
his debilitated condition immediately after the accident.'"3 Where
a workman wounds his toe, is treated for that. hut subsequently
erysipelas sets in and lie (lies from blood poisoning, it is not
nccessiry that the death should be the natural or probable consequence of the original injury; it is sufficient that the chain
of causation is not broken by a novus actus inten.cniens.94 And
"hOvUs actus intcrvenicns'"here means not only a new, but also
an unconnected cause. 95 Where a workman hurts his knee,
necessitating an operation, which is successful, but later contracts scarlet fever, the wound suppurates and the knee joint has
to be excised, causing incapacity, it being found that the suppuration might have been caused by the fever hut that were it
not for the wound it could not have had the effect it did, the
incapacity should be deemed the result of the accident. 6 Where
a workman was paralyzed by an accidental injury and some
twelve months later (lied of pneumonia contracted several days
before his death, the death is the result of the accident, though
the pneumonia (lid not result from his original injury, but rather
his exhausted vitality and reduced power of resistance, which
were caused by such injury, made him unable to resist an attack of pneumonia and rendered it fatal."T
The French rule, on the other hand, is more strict. Where,
as the result of an accident. a vigorous and active workman was
confined to bed in a milieu favorable to infection, which confinement resulted in a state of great weakness and severe depression in the course of which lie contracted tuberculosis from
which he died, it was found that the accident had not directly
"Ystradowen Co. Y. Griffiths. 2 B. Wl. C. C. 357 (1909).
"Dunham -v.
Clare. 4 M.-S. W. C. C. T02 (19o2).
In re Etherington. supfra, note n2.
Tlrown v. Kent. 6 PB.W. C. C. 75 (74913).
M:'si. Ind. Ace. Rd.: Mcrritt's Case, 2 Mass. W. C. C. 63,; (11i4).
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caused the disease but had produced the physical condition which

made the workman susceptible to it and was the certain though
indirect cause of his death: but the highest court held that that
was not .-uficient, and that the death or incapacity must be the
9
"direct and immediate " consequence of the accident".
The German rule on this point applies generally to all posterior causes of aggravation, and is as follows. The death or
incapacity need not be the direct result of the accident, but may
result, indirectly, from unfavorable circumstances produced by
the accident. And the accident need not be the sole cause of
the death or incapacity, it being sufficient that it is a weighty
contributing cause.""0
Impending death or incapacity may be merely accelerated
by a new disease. Thus where a workman, who was suffering
from debility caused by a severe accident, which would have
caused death within six months in any event, had his death
hastened by an attack of influenza, it was held that such death
was the result of the accident." ' This decision raises this
question: If death from an accident accelerated by a disease
is to be attributed altogether to the accident, why is not death
from a disease accelerated by an accident to be attributed altogether to the disease? And yet, as has been seen.1 " in the latter
case the contrary is held.
Misconduct of the Victim.
It is a general rule that aggravations of injury imputable
to the misconduct of the victim should not be considered results
of the accident. Put what constitutes misconduct?
Misconduct need not be positive, but may consist of the
o.mission of a duty. The statutory obligation of the employer
"lmmediate" is almost synonymous with "proxinmate." and seems to
be here used with a meaning a- elastic and uncertain as that given to the
failer uord in Eng!h.h and .\merican law
'Socitk,
Xotc.le v. Vetive Granqe. Cour de Cass.. Feb. 21, 1912;
CCsee
al'
ho11 V. Scj,t
St. Na7aire, id.. Nor. 8, 1o9.
'Ha idbuch. p. 240.
' Thlloburn v.
lBedlirngton Co.. i B. V. C. C. 128 (itti.
'"Supra.

pp. 419-421.
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to pay compensation is subject to the implied condition that
the workman shall use such reasonable care and remedial
measures as are practicable and available.' 0 3
The injured workman must submit to all reasonahle surgical
operations.t 4 This does not mean that lie can be compelled to
submit, but simply that if he refuses to submit the consequences
of such refusal should not be charged to the accident. He need
not submit to a doubtful and serious operation or to one entailing

danger to life.loa Some decisions have gone further and laid
down the rule that he need not submit to certain specific operations involving an impairment to the integrity of his body, nor to
the administration of anaesthetics. because it entails danger to
life) 0 6 But the better rule seems to be that he must submit to
whatever a reasonable man. not claiming compensation, would
10 7
He
elect to undergo for his own advantage and comfort.
need submit to nothing unreasonable: and the test of reasonableness is, not whether on the balance of medical opinion the
operation might reasonably be performed, but whether the man
in refusing to undergo it acts reasonably.' 0 8 It is reasonable
for the workman to refuse an operation upon the advice of his
own physician, if the latter be honest and competent, although
the majority of the expert advice is to the contrary.10 '
Some allowance, especially for temporary refusal, should fie
made for the ignorance, prejudices, and fears of the injured
workman." 0 Thus where the surgeons in a hospital sought the
consent to operate on an ignorant foreigner, on the evening of
his accident and while he was semi-unconscious, and were put off
Donnelly v. Baird, i B. IV. C. C. q5 (igo8); cf. Handbuch. p. 25i,
x'"Jandbuch. p. 313; Guerry v. Bourseau. Cour de Cass.. Feb. 15, x9io;

Anderson v. Baird Co.. 40 S. L. R. -63 (1903) ; Donnelly v. Baird, supra, note
io3: Warnicken v. Moreland, 2 B. W. C. C. 350 (1909); Nicotero's Case, 2
Mass. NV. C. C. 351 (1914).
'"Gouttey

v. Bourgenot.

Cour d'Appl de Besancon. Nov. 27,

McNally v. Hudson. 9. Atl. 122 (N. J. i915); Handbuch, p. 313.
. Sachet. pp. 253-4: H1andbitch. pp. 252. 313.
'" Sweeney v. Pumpherston Co.. 40 S. L R. 721 (t193).
2 B. W. C. C..36 (1o ).
zaje~tie."
"*Tutton v. S. S.
,Sweeney v. Ptun;pherston Co.. supro, note 107.
" Sachet. p. 255.

1901;
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by his faint refusal, but about noon the next (lay finally obtained
his consent, operated and he died, it was held that the delay in
yielding consent was not unreasonable."" The decision in this
case, however, might well have been based upon the ground that
the evidence negatived all idea that the consequences of the
accident had been aggravated by the delay.
The injured workman must likewise submit to proper medical treatment and follow reasonable medical advice. "2 Medical
treatment is here used in its broadest sense to include examinations, dressings and bandagings, special treatments (such as
massage and electro-therapy), hypodermic injections of antitoxins, lancing of sores, removal to a hospital or sanitarium, taking prescribed medicines, use of prescribed and provided apparatus (such as special boots, eye glasses, and trusses), exercising
injured parts, general regulations of conduct, etc.' 3 But he
will not be held responsible for the consequences of refusal to
submit to the medical treatment where such refusal is not unreasonable.' 1 4 Thus it has been held not to be unreasonable to
refuse to submit to unusually violent mechanical treatment,
ordered by a consultation of the highest medical authorities,
where the local physician advised against it, and neither he nor
the workman were informed of the high source of the order;
nor to refuse to go to a hospital proved to be unclean. On the
other hand, it was held unreasonable for a woman to refuse to
go to a hospital, because she did not want to neglect her children
and household, when due provision was offered for their care.1 15
Nor will the workman be held responsible for failure to conform
to the medical regime prescribed, where such failure is due to
nervousness 116, ignorance, or positive inability. Nor will he
always be held strictly accountable, if. through habit or preju"1 Jendrus v. Detroit Co., T44 N. W. 563 (Mich. 1913).
332 Handbuch, pp. 251-2, 257.
"'Handbuch. p. 313; Sachet, pp. 254-6; Steele v. Bilham, 128 L. T. J.
416 (gio), cit. Stone & Grove: "Workmen's Compensation and Employers
Liability Cases."
3"Moss
v. Akers. 4 B.IV. C. C. 294 (1911).
"' Ilandbuch. p. 314.
" Smith v. Coed Co., 2 M.-S. W. C. C. 121 (19oo).
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dice, he has resorted to a family remedy or followed the advice
of a quack instead of adhering to the treatment prescribed.",
Where, after the original treatment has terminated, a new
course of treatment becomes necessary, an injured workman's

duties are much the same as at first. He must even then submit
to a slight and usual operation.'1

8

But after his wound has

healed he need not submit to new operations in the nature of experiments. 19 'Heneed submit to a new treatment only where
there is a well founded belief that it will result in an increase
in his earning capacity. A mere possibility of amelioration is not
12 0
sufficient
Where an injured workman unreasonably refuses to submit
to treatment or an operation, the burden still rests upon .the employer to break the chain of causation and show that the incapacity is due, wholly or partly, not to the accident, but to such
refusal. 21 But where the workman refuses all care for a curable
be deemed the result of
injury any subsequent incapacity should
122
accident
the
of
not
and
such refusal
An injured workman must take exercise or seek light work,
as may be appropriate, to regain his earning capacity, and must
refrain from vicious habits tending to prevent recovery or to
impair his working powers. Where his injury is healed but he
is too weak to work because he has unreasonably refrained from
proper exercise, his incapacity is not due to his accident 1 23
Where he has recovered from his injury -but is incapacitated
because he has brooded so much over his accident that his mind
will not allow him to muster courage to return to or continue
at his work, or because he has become hysterical through worry"'HIandbuch, p. 252.
"'Dowds v. Bennie, 40 S. L R. 239 (10o3); Handbuch, p. 311.
de Marseille v. Denestebe, Cour de Cass., Dec. 16, igiz.
' Socikt
2"IHandbuch, p. 312.
" Marshall v. Orient Co., i K. B. 79 (Eng. zgTo); Handbuch, pp. 257-A,
313-4. Undvr the German law where an-injured workman wrongly refuses
to submit to the medical or surgiral treatment, his compensation may be
wholly or partly suspended for a definite period, such suspension being
subject to renewal for continued refusal, the purpose being rather to force
compliance than to do exact cquity in the event of non-compliance.
Clavier v. Compagnic G.T.. Cour d'Appcl de Rennes, Dec. 10, 190T.
Upper Forest Co. v. Gray, 3 B. W. C. C 424 (igio) ; David v. Windsor
Co., 4 id. 177 (i911).
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ing over the chances of his claim for compensation, his inability
to work does not result from the injury.12-4 If after treatment
he is unable to start in again at his old occupation but is fit
to start in with "light work", he must accept such work if
offered or available, otherwise his continued incapacity will be
due to that cause and not to his accident. 125 If after injury a
workman takes to drink and subsequently is refused or discharged
from employment for that reason, his inability to obtain or retain employment should not be ascribed to his injury.1 26 And,
generally, where drunkenness interferes with the treatment none
of the consequences which would probably have been avoided
had it not been for such drunkenness should be charged to the
1 27
accident.
An injured workman should take reasonable care of himself
immediately after in accident, and should enable the employer
to co-operate by giving the latter prompt notice (regardless of
the terms of the statute as to formal notice), both of the accident and of all subsequent developments calling for treatment.
Where an unusual wetting, or exposure to an unusual draft, etc.,
when wet or overheated, is held to constitute an accident, but the
workman does not treat the event as an accident, and goes his
usual way, neglecting all precautions, until-some days later an
acute illness develops, as in Drylie v. Alloa Company,'2 8 such illness, it is submitted, contrary to the decision in that case, should
be imputed to his neglect and not to the accident. And similarly
where a workman suffers a slight injury, neglects it and keeps
on at his work, blood poisoning which supervenes should not be
attributed to the accident. 2 9
"i olt v. Yates. 3 B. W. C. C. 75 (igog) ; Higgs v. Unicume, 6 id. 2o5
Handbuch, p. 23o. On the facts such cases as these are difficult
to distinguish from many cases of traumatic neurasthenia, e. g. Eaves v.
Blaenclydach Co., 2 B. W. C. C. 329 (i909); Hunnewel's Case, 22o Mass.
(1913)

351 (1915).

Furness v. Bennett, 3 B. V. C. C. z95 (igio).
Hill v. Ocean Co., 3 B. V. C. C. 29 (igog).
Handbuch, p. 25!; and ef. McCarthy's Case, 2 Mass. W. C. C. 57

'
"

"'

(1914).

6 B. IV.CC. .398
-

(~t(3).

Landry v. Rocherean. supra, note 72; but see, contra, Fleming's Case, supra, note 73; and Handbuch, p. 249.
'-"Veuvc
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Summary.
On the general subject of posterior causes of aggravation
the principal controversial question is the degree of causality
that must exist between the vmlployment or the accident and the
posterior cause or its consequences. The French rule practically
requires that the former shall be the proximate cause of the
latter, whereas the British rule requires only that the former
contribute to the latter however indirectly or remotely, while the
German rule, in between tlhese two extremes, requires that the
former shall at least contribute to the latter weightily. Each
of these rules has its disadvantages. The German and British
rules, the latter more especially, require some time limniation,
otherwise a permanent injury may continue for the life of the
injured personi to be the subject of frequent claims for aggravations resulting from doubtfully and remotely connected causes.
Such is often the case in Germany. In Great Britain that abuse
is avoided by the practice of "lunp sum" settlements; but under
the American statutes that practice is either prohibited or discouraged.
Consequently a time limitation within which death or incapacity nmst result from the accident is .quite general in
American statutes. Moreover many of our statutes contain
provisions defining or, more accurately, attempting to define the
relation of causality required. Thus some of those statutes prescribe that the injuries to be compensated for shall include only
injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and
such diseases or infections as naturally result therefrom.130
Others cover only "accidental injuries and such diseases or infections as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrorh". 1 3 1
Others provide that "injury" shall not include a disease "except
as it shall result from the injury" ;132 or "except as it shall
directly result from an injury". 33 Yet others provide that the
'Lo.nuisiana.

See. 3o: Nebraska, Sec. 52b; Pennsylvania, Sec. 301.

Maryland. Sec. 62 (6): New York, Sec. 3 (7).

Iowa. Sec. 2477-m z6 g: Indiana. Sec. -6 (1; Vermont. See. 8.
Wyyoming, Sec. 6 m..•
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injury must be proximately paused by accident.' 34 And the
Montana statute 13-s provides that "injury refers only to an injury
resulting from some fortuitous event, as distinguished from the

contraction of a disease".
P. Tecuinsehs Sherman.
Nc-v York City.
...
Wisconsin, Sec. 2394-3 (3); Colorado, Sec. 8 (III).
" Sec. 6 q.

